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FOREWORD

The Asia-Pacific region has become increasingly central
to U.S. national security concerns. The drawdown of U.S.
forces that began in the mid-1970s has not translated into a
decline in U.S. interest or engagement in the Asia-Pacific.
The United States continues to have a significant forward
presence, steadfast allies, and thriving trade and
investment in countries throughout the region.
While most countries there have enjoyed dramatic
economic growth rates and unparalleled prosperity in the
late 20th century, challenges to peace and stability remain.
The United States must continue to monitor carefully the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile
technology, simmering ethnic conflict, on-going territorial
disputes, and also be alert to the threats of terrorism,
international crime, and drug trafficking. Moreover, the
potential for a major theater war remains, as does the
prospect of small-scale contingencies.
The authors of this monograph survey the challenges to
U.S. national security that confront this diverse and
dynamic region, highlighting the particularly volatile
situation that continues on the Korean peninsula. Beyond
continued U.S. attention to maintaining a robust military
presence and steadfast U.S. alliances, they argue that the
United States, without ignoring the key dimensions in the
U.S. National Security Strategy of “responding” and
“preparing now,” should give a greater emphasis to
“shaping” the Asia-Pacific region. They contend that the
time is ripe for the United States to launch a major “shaping
initiative” to help ensure that the positive trends of
marketization, democratization, and regional integration
continue and strengthen in the 21st century. Building on a
bipartisan consensus with careful attention to interagency
coordination at home, and in close consultation with allies
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abroad, the United States, they recommend, should devise a
new road map to guide Asia-Pacific policy.
The authors conclude that, due to finite resources, the
United States should concentrate in particular on “pivotal”
states—those countries that serve as linchpins in the
region. They identify several such states and urge special
attention to these to help ensure that they evolve along
democratic, prosperous, and peaceful trajectories. The
authors conclude that the most serious concern remains
North Korea. They suggest a cautious, consistent, and
pragmatic approach to Pyongyang targeted at fostering
evolutionary change with incremental improvements in
bilateral relations by the United States depending on
positive moves by North Korea.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Interim Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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THE ASIA-PACIFIC IN THE
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY CALCULUS
FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM

In the 20th century the Asia-Pacific region became a
focal point of U.S. national security interest. 1 In the 21st
century the Asia-Pacific region threatens to supplant
Europe as the region of paramount national security
interest to the United States. Despite the strong Eurocentrism long dominant in the U.S. national security
establishment, the United States has long seen Asia as a
vast potential market and an important source of raw
materials. The United States has a 100-year history as an
Asia-Pacific power—an era that began with the annexation
of Hawaii and the Philippines in 1898. Since then, Asia’s
strategic importance has only grown. This is reflected in the
fact that U.S. Army battle deaths since 1945 were more than
double those incurred in the Asia-Pacific Theater during
World War II. 2 Five of the seven defense and security
agreements and treaties to which the United States
committed itself since 1945 are in Asia. 3 In addition to three
military conflicts in Asia during the 20th century, the
closest to the brink of war that the United States has come
in the 1990s has been in Asia: a confrontation with North
Korea over Pyongyang’s nuclear program in 1993-94 and
the crisis in the Taiwan Strait in early 1996. 4
The most serious flash point in Asia today continues to
be Korea. This was demonstrated by the launch of the Taepo
Dong 1 ballistic missile on August 31, 1998, on a trajectory
over Japan and by the naval battle that took place between
North and South Korean vessels on June 13, 1999. 5 In the
year 2000, a state of war continues to exist on the Korean
Peninsula. A North Korean regime that many predicted
would collapse has a significant weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) capability and missiles capable of
delivering a warhead perhaps as far away as Alaska and
Hawaii.6
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Today, foreign trade with Asia is as vital to the United
States as that with Europe, and approximately 100,000 U.S.
military personnel are stationed in the Asia-Pacific. 7 The
United States places great emphasis on the region’s security
and stability. Unfettered access to the sea and air lines of
communication necessary to maintain commerce and
economic growth in Asia is vital to the United States, its
allies, and friends. As the Secretary of Defense wrote in the
1999 Annual Report to the President and the Congress: “The
United States seeks a stable and economically prosperous
East Asia that embraces democratic reform and market
economics.” 8 Specifically, the report identifies as the most
significant danger to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific
region the military threat posed by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) both to South Korea and to the
37,000 U.S. troops stationed there as part of our forward
presence. 9 The United States seeks a peaceful resolution to
the Korean conflict, desires to maintain its current alliance
structure in Asia, and to build on its bilateral alliances. In a
departure from earlier policies, the United States also
supports multilateral security efforts in Asia, such as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional
Forum (ARF). 10
The national interest of the United States is best served
by a region free of conflict, and the majority of countries in
the Asia-Pacific agree that the presence of American forces
is key to regional peace and stability. 11 More broadly, in
addition to fulfilling a security role in the region, the United
States wants to use its influence and leadership to expand
democracy in the region and to counter such transnational
threats to peace as the proliferation of missiles and WMD,
illegal trafficking in drugs, and terrorism. 12
The U.S. role as a “security guarantor and regional
balancer” in the Asia-Pacific is important and worthy of
further discussion. 13 In its most recent update of the East
Asia Strategy Review, the Department of Defense made it
clear that being the dominant power in the region is not part
of the U.S. vision. Rather, the United States seeks a balance
2

of power wherein no country is in a position to become a
hegemon by dictating to the other countries in the region
how territorial, security, or economic matters will be
solved. 14 The enlargement of democracy and market
economies in Asia are also important U.S. interests related
to humanitarian concerns and the region’s vitality.
The cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Pacific is the strong
economic relationship and military alliance with Japan.
Relations with the Republic of Korea are also key to U.S.
interests in the Pacific. That said, special attention to China
is a feature of nearly all U.S. strategy documents on the
Asia-Pacific. China is the most populous country in the
world, has the largest military force, and by virtue of
geography, dominates the region. Historically, from the 3rd
century to the 19th century, China exercised suzerainty
over most of the region. U.S. foreign policy and security
strategy commits the nation to continued engagement with
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a means to
encourage Beijing to fully integrate itself responsibly in the
world community. 15 Despite the strains in U.S.-China
relations during 1999 over the accidental bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia by U.S aircraft during
Operation Allied Force, the Cox Report on Chinese
espionage, and allegations of illegal campaign financing in
the United States by China’s intelligence services, it is
simply impossible to ignore and isolate China today. 16
Neither the realities of the post-Cold War world nor the
actions of U. S. friends and allies in the Pacific or Europe
will permit a return to the past. Some form of engagement
with China has been a factor in U.S. security policy since
1971. Given China’s permanent membership on the United
Nations Security Council, its role and influence on the
Korean Peninsula, in Southeast Asia, and South Asia, its
economic weight, and its activities as a provider of advanced
weapons and technology to other countries, the United
States will maintain a basic policy of continued contact with
China. There will be some military and security component
of that engagement policy, despite recurrent strains. China
3

has a history of isolation, xenophobia, and the use of force
along its periphery. 17 The United States seeks to encourage
China to become more politically, economically, and even
militarily integrated into the Asia-Pacific region.
Notwithstanding the emphasis on China, however, the most
important component of U.S. security policy in the region is
the alliance with Japan.
The Human Rights Issue.
There is a certain tension inherent in the American goals
of promoting democratic reform and the authoritarian
traditions in Asia. Leaders from countries with which the
United States enjoys some of the closest friendships in the
region, Singapore, for instance, argue forcibly for a different
understanding of human rights than Washington. Asian
values, explain the leaders from these countries, emphasize
the stability of society and the general well-being and health
of the populace over the emphasis placed by the United
States and the West on rights of individuals. 18 China and a
number of ASEAN states share this alternative view. 19 One
argument that is often heard from China in particular is
that a low “educational and cultural level,” as well as social
tradition, make the Western liberal form of human rights
with its emphasis on the individual and self-determination
inappropriate for Asia. 20 Liberal democracy and free
elections, so successful in Japan and Thailand, are political
institutions that are characterized by critics of U.S. strategy
as foreign, and imposed there by the post-war American
presence. But that argument is belied by the successful
transitions to democracy of the Republic of Korea, the
Philippines, and Taiwan. 21 The broad trend is toward the
establishment of a civil society and democratization, and
those countries that have embraced democracy in East Asia
have been successful.

4

The Security Environment Today.
The Military Dimension. The continued military threat
posed to the Republic of Korea (ROK) by the DPRK (North
Korea) is the greatest danger in the region. 22 This threat
demands the presence of a United Nations Command on the
Korean Peninsula, because a state of war still exists there.
But other threats to peace and stability continue to exist.
China refuses to renounce the use of force against
Taiwan to reunite that island with the mainland. 23 China’s
claims to the disputed Spratly Islands, in the South China
Sea, also pose a latent danger to security. Although Beijing
has told ASEAN that it will discuss joint development in the
South China Sea, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
continues to establish new military outposts and upgrade
existing structures on reefs in the disputed areas, most
recently on Mischief Reef, claimed also by the Philippines. 24
China’s National Defense Law, which charges the PLA with
the responsibility to defend its extensive maritime claims, is
also threatening to China’s neighbors. Japan, China, and
Taiwan also dispute control of the Senkaku Islands, in the
East China Sea. There have been demonstrations of
military force there. 25 Russia continues to occupy the
Northern Territories of Japan, which it occupied after
World War II. 26 Despite the degraded capability of the
Russian military, that dispute has yet to be settled. Table 1
shows existing threats and conflicting territorial claims. 27
Instability and Non-military Conflicts. From a military
security standpoint, although the Asia-Pacific region has
been relatively stable since the U.S. withdrawal from
Vietnam, there have been serious conflicts. Vietnam was
unified by force in 1975 and then invaded Cambodia 3 years
later. China invaded Vietnam in 1979, Myanmar military
forces repeatedly have crossed the border into Thailand,
and China has threatened to invade Taiwan and attacked
ships from Vietnam in the South China Sea. The insurgency
in Sri Lanka continues to simmer, and India and Pakistan
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TABLE 1
Country/Area

International Dispute(s)

Bangladesh

• boundary with India

Brunei

• may wish to purchase the Malaysian salient
that divides the country
• Spratly Islands claims
• Louisa Reef “exclusive fishing zone”
proclaimed

Cambodia

• offshore islands, boundary with Vietnam
• maritime boundary with Vietnam
• border with Thailand
• maritime boundary with Thailand

China

• boundary with India
• two sections of the boundary with Russia
• boundary with Tajikistan
• boundary with North Korea
• Spratly Island claims
• maritime boundary with Vietnam
• Paracel Islands occupied by China, claimed
by Vietnam and Taiwan
•claims Japanese-administered Senkaku-shoto
(Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Tai)
• land border with Vietnam

India

• boundary with China
• status of Kashmir, against Pakistan
• Indus River water resources, with Pakistan
• boundary with Bangladesh

Indonesia

• sovereignty over East Timor Province
• demarcation line with Vietnam on
continental shelf in South China Sea, near
Natuna Island
• two islands in dispute with Malaysia

Japan

• Kurile Islands, against Russia
• Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima/Tokdo)
disputed with South Korea
• Senkaku-shoto (Senkaku Islands) claimed
by China and Taiwan

North Korea

•33-km section of boundary with China
• Demarcation Line with South Korea
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South Korea

•Demarcation Line with North Korea
• Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima/Tokdo)
claimed by Japan

Laos

• parts of the border with Thailand

Malaysia

• Spratly Islands against China, Philippines,
Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei
• Sabah State claimed by the Philippines
• Malaysian salient dividing Brunei
• two islands in dispute with Singapore
• islands in Celebes Sea, in dispute with
Indonesia
• offshore demarcation line with Vietnam

Pakistan

• status of Kashmir, with India
• Indus River water rights

Philippines

• Spratly Islands
• claims Malaysian state of Sabah

Singapore

• two islands in dispute with Malaysia

Spratly Islands

• all of the Spratly Islands are claimed by China,
Taiwan, and Vietnam; parts of them are claimed
by Malaysia and the Philippines
• in 1984, Brunei established an exclusive fishing
zone, which encompasses Louisa Reef in the
southern Spratly Islands, but has not publicly
claimed the island

Taiwan

• claims by China, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam,
Brunei
• Paracel Islands occupied by China, but claimed
by Vietnam and Taiwan
• Japanese-administered Senkaku-shoto
(Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Tai)

Thailand

• parts of the border with Laos, Cambodia
• maritime boundary with Cambodia

Vietnam

• maritime boundary with Cambodia
• Spratly Islands
• maritime boundaries with China, Malaysia
• Paracel Islands occupied by China
• Offshore islands and sections of boundary with
Cambodia
• sections of land border with China
• demarcation line with Indonesia on continental
shelf near Natuna Island
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face each other on the Line of Control in the intractable
Kashmir dispute. And the Korean Peninsula is a continuing
source of tension. But other forms of conflict could also
destabilize the region. Conflict does not always mean war,
and factors with the potential for internal or external
competition and friction must be considered .
Political instability, ethnic conflict, and religious strife
are also present in the Asia-Pacific. In South Asia the
disputed areas of Jammu and Kashmir have been the focus
of three wars between India and Pakistan. For months in
mid-1999, the two countries clashed as India used ground
and air forces to drive Pakistani guerrillas from Indiancontrolled Kashmir. This half-century-old conflict seems to
defy resolution. While both countries are loath to attribute
these conflicts solely to religious and ethnic differences,
they play a major role by placing the Indo-Pakistani border
in intractable dispute. With nuclear weapons and missile
delivery systems under the control of New Delhi and
Islamabad, the standoff on their border is now a far more
serious problem. It is unclear how the military regime that
seized power in October 1999 in Pakistan will affect the
situation on the subcontinent.
Before May 1998, it appeared that the state of tension
that existed between China and India over their mutual
border was being resolved. However, when India’s Defense
Minister George Fernandes strongly criticized Chinese
military intentions in the Indian press immediately after
the departure of General Fu Quanyou, the Chief of the
General Staff Department of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army, it was clear that the Sino-Indian rift had
merely been papered over. 28 Fernandes’ insult to General
Fu reminded the Chinese of the way that Jawaharlal Nehru
had treated Zhou Enlai in the negotiations over the
McMahon Line in 1960. 29 India used the threat posed by
China’s existing nuclear arsenal as justification for its own
nuclear tests of May 1998, and Pakistan followed with tests
on May 28 and 30, 1998. 30 The Pakistani missile systems
and nuclear weapons were built with considerable
8

assistance from China; a fact not lost on New Delhi, which
only compounds the poor state of Sino-Indian relations. 31
Mutual suspicion between China and India over intentions
in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean also remain
factors that affect relations between the two countries and
create concerns in the rest of Asia. A security study by
Chinese scholars in 1993 expressed concerns over Indian
naval expansion into the South China Sea, also a latent
concern of Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore. 32
Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world
and the planet’s largest Muslim state has also been a center
of instability in the wake of the 1997-98 East Asian financial
crisis. Problems that were exacerbated by the economic
situation only worsened already-existing ethnic and
religious tensions. Malaysia shares similar economic and
stability problems, particularly with Chinese minorities
who, since well before independence, have been concentrated in the banking and commercial sectors. This
conspicuous ethnic concentration of wealth has made the
Chinese citizens of those countries the target of periodic
ethnic attacks.
In Indonesia pressure for political reform led to the
ouster of President Suharto in 1998 and the electoral defeat
of his successor, B.J. Habibie, in 1999. It is not clear how
well the new administration of President Abdurrahman
Wahid will cope with the myriad of problems confronting
the country. While the Indonesian parliament on October
20, 1999, ratified the August 30 pro-independence vote in
East Timor (as of this writing the former Portuguese colony
was under United Nations’ trusteeship and all Indonesian
military forces had left the territory), ethnic and religious
strife continue to plague the country and secessionist
movements persist in areas like the Aceh region of western
Sumatra.
In Malaysia, President Mahathir Mohamad has used a
series of legal maneuvers to suppress his political
challenger. 33 Mahathir, the longest serving democratically
9

elected leader in Asia, led his party to another electoral
triumph in November 1999, although with a reduced
majority in the parliament. The most noteworthy outcome
of the election was the dramatically improved showing of
the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party known as PAS. 34 This
tendency to use rule by law, rather than the rule of law, to
maintain its ruling People’s Action Party in power also
exists in Singapore, but does not presently threaten
stability there. In both places, but more sharply in
Indonesia, the ethnic and religious tensions have the
potential to explode out of control and turn into the sort of
mass-hatred and “ethnic cleansing” that engulfed the
Balkans, most notably in Kosovo, in the recent past. Such an
outcome would affect Australia, a traditional and staunch
ally of the United States, and Singapore, which has
permitted the United States to maintain a naval presence.
In Oceania, where Australia exercises the most
influence, there are also serious security problems. A coup
was attempted in Papua New Guinea by mercenaries and a
low-level insurgency continues on the island of
Bougainville.
Instability threatens Cambodia, where rival factions
still fight along the northern border with Laos and
Thailand. The March 6, 1999, arrest of Ta Mok, the Khmer
Rouge leader, helped stabilize the situation somewhat. 35
Moreover, the populace of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos
face the continued threat of land mines. Many of these were
left from the Vietnam War, a legacy of the United States.
But the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and subsequent
internal war there with Chinese-supported forces also left a
considerable number of land mines behind. The U.N. still
manages a major demining effort in Cambodia.
Tensions persist along the Thailand-Myanmar border
fueled by the presence of refugees from Myanmar living in
camps along the Thai side of the border. The Thai
government, for example, has permitted the Karen ethnic
group to maintain camps inside. 36 The Karen are opposed to
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the rule of the existing regime in Myanmar, the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC, formerly called the State
Law and Order Restoration Commission, or SLORC) and
are conducting a cross-border guerrilla war from refugee
camps in northwest Thailand. 37 While the Thai and
Myanmar governments seem to have worked out a modus
vivendi, should the Karen rebels conduct a major offensive,
initiate acts of serious economic sabotage, or threaten the
rule of the SPDC, the potential exists for large-scale
incursions into Thailand by the Myanmar Army against
Karen camps. The extreme actions of radical groups from
Myanmar have also caused turmoil inside Thailand
recently. The most shocking incident was the seizure by 10
gunmen from Myanmar of a Thai hospital filled with
hundreds of staff and patients on January 24, 2000. 38
Finally, Southeast Asia, Myanmar and Thailand in
particular, are ravaged by prostitution, drugs, and the
AIDS epidemic wrought by these two social problems. An
indication of the magnitude of this problem is that in 1995
the HIV-positive rate among Thai military recruits was
more than 15 percent. 39
Security Structures in the Asia-Pacific.
In Asia, there is no multilateral security structure to
provide for collective defense or the management of regional
security issues such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Europe. In the Americas,
the United States relied on the Rio Pact to serve as a
security mechanism and bulwark against the Soviet Bloc. In
Asia, however, security issues have defied regional
approaches and, for the United States as well as for Russia,
bilateral or limited multilateral approaches have been the
norm.
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a
sub-regional grouping that was based on Cold War
containment strategy led by the United States, withered in
11

the heat of the U.S. war in Vietnam. 40 Seeking to stabilize
peninsular Southeast Asia after independence for
Singapore, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia,
Singapore and Malaysia formed the Five-Power Defense
Arrangement (FPDA). 41 While still extant, the FPDA is
strained today as much by new hostility between Singapore
and Malaysia as by the limitations of combined training
among the member countries because the financial crisis in
Asia has reduced defense budgets. It was far stronger and
served as a confidence-building and security mechanism in
the 1960s and 1970s, when a new Singapore was fearful it
would be swallowed by Malaysia; both of those countries
were wary of Indonesia; and a communist insurgency was
still simmering. The ANZUS pact, the trilateral
organization of Australia, New Zealand, and the United
States, was weakened considerably when New Zealand
refused to permit U.S. nuclear-armed (or powered) ships or
aircraft to visit or operate in its sovereign territory. U.S.
bonds with Australia remain strong, but American security
ties with New Zealand are weaker, and will continue to be
limited so long as New Zealand maintains its anti-nuclear
stance.
The bilateral alliances of the United States in Asia either
grew out of World War II or emerged during the Cold War.
Originally designed to guarantee security against
communism and the Soviet Union, the U.S.-Japan and
U.S.-Republic of Korea security agreements are strong
today. Our security ties with Japan are the most important.
They are the bedrock of the U.S.-Pacific presence. 42 The
U.S.-Thailand security agreement perhaps had more teeth
during the Vietnam War era, but our bilateral ties with
Thailand are important to both countries and there is still
strategic glue in the treaty. The final U.S. security treaty
that existed in the region, the Mutual Security Treaty with
the Republic of China, was abrogated unilaterally by the
United States when President Carter recognized the PRC
as the sole government of China on January 1, 1979. The
U.S. is still obligated to maintain a security relationship
12

with Taiwan, however, by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)
of 1979.43 The TRA makes clear “that the U.S. decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of
China rests on the expectation that the future of Taiwan
will be determined by peaceful means.” 44 The Act also
requires that the United States provide arms to Taiwan of a
defensive character and maintain its own (the United
States) capacity to resist any “resort to force or other forms
of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social
or economic system, of the people in Taiwan.” 45 It is a finely
worded document with intentional ambiguity built into it,
which nevertheless makes it clear that some security
relationship remains between the United States and its
former ally. One source of controversy is the U.S.-Japan
Joint Logistics Support Agreement, renegotiated in 1997, as
it applies to contingencies involving Taiwan. 46
Future Challenges and Desired Outcomes.
How the division of the Korean Peninsula is resolved
presents the greatest challenge not only to the United
States, but to all of the countries in the region. There is no
single security problem in Asia that could bring us into war
with such certainty. The balance of forces in the Taiwan
Strait are also a matter of serious concern. Any attempt by
the PRC and its PLA either to blockade the island of Taiwan
to pressure its reunification through the use of force, or to
invade the island is sure to evoke a strong American
response. This was the case in March 1996, when two U.S.
aircraft carrier battle groups were sent south of Taiwan
when the PLA bracketed the island with M-9 ( Dong
Feng-15) missiles. 47 In South Asia, the nuclear balance
between India and Pakistan has eroded U.S. security policy
and leadership, in the effort to counter the proliferation of
WMD and their delivery means. In Sri Lanka a bloody
communal war continues between the Tamil minority and
the Sinhalese majority. In Southeast Asia and the South
China Sea, the transition of Cambodia to stability and the
removal of land mines are important to the United States,
13

and affect directly a U.S. ally, Thailand. In neighboring
Myanmar the ruling military junta refused to accept the
outcome of a democratic election. This junta, the SPDC, is
engaged in a counter-insurgency war that often involves
cross-border military operations into Thailand against a
Myanmar minority group, the Karen. And in Indonesia, a
society with a precarious balance of Muslim, Christian,
Hindu, and Confucian faiths and cultures is percolating as
the country confronts major economic and political
challenges. These religious and ethnic schisms, as they
rupture, have the potential to boil over and affect the social
orders of Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, which to
one extent or another share the diverse ethnic and religious
makeup of Indonesia. 48
Turning to Northeast Asia, North Korea now depends on
outside sources for about 25 percent of its food supply. 49
Despite the collapse of its policy of self-reliance and the near
collapse of its economy (as many as a million North Koreans
may have starved to death), the North maintains a strong
military with forward-emplaced artillery directly
threatening South Korea. The North also has a formidable
special operations capability that could cripple defenses in
the South and disrupt the economy. Despite its economic
problems, North Korea continues to launch dangerous,
provocative commando operations against the South. As
noted earlier, in August 1998, in a move that shocked
United States and Japanese observers, North Korea
launched a ballistic missile. 50 Whether this was a failed
satellite launch, as claimed by Pyongyang, or not, North
Korea demonstrated that it may soon be able to hit the
United States with these missiles. 51 This capability is
especially alarming because when the Agreed Framework
was negotiated with North Korea in 1994, the Central
Intelligence Agency concluded that Pyongyang’s nuclear
weapons program might have obtained enough plutonium
for one or two devices. 52 Ideally, through patient diplomacy
backed by the teeth of our strong military presence on the
Korean Peninsula, the reconciliation of the two Koreas can
14

take place peacefully (see conclusion). But a sudden collapse
in the North or a last-ditch military adventure by
Pyongyang against the South is possible. In either case,
Chinese military leaders have made it clear that U.S. forces
would not be welcome along the Sino-North Korean border.
The North Korean missile launch has also raised the
specter of another eventuality that would send chills
throughout Asia—the possibility of Japanese remilitarization and military action. According to Akitaka Saiki,
deputy press secretary to Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi,
Japan’s constitution permits preemptive attacks for
self-defense, even if Japan has suffered no damage or
attack. Indeed, the concept of self-defense, according to
Defense Minister Hosei Norota, would permit Japan to
launch preemptive strikes on North Korean missile bases
or bases in other countries.53
Regional Trends.
The broad trend in the Asia-Pacific region has been to
subordinate political and military competition to the
maintenance of an environment that encouraged economic
development and prosperity through trade. While matters
of national sovereignty occasionally flare, such as in
Kashmir, the Spratly Islands, and the Yellow Sea, nearly all
of the governments in the region seem to avoid serious
conflicts that would jeopardize economic growth. Most of the
countries affected by the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98
rankled at what they say as the heavy-handed approach of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 54
Nonetheless, all of the countries in the region have
instituted major structural and institutional economic
reforms. Defense spending, however, has dropped
significantly in many countries. 55 This has lessened the
likelihood that an arms race would develop in the region,
but has had a negative effect on security cooperation. Those
countries with which the United States normally seeks to
engage with exercise or training activities have not had the
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funds to be as active as in the past. 56 There are two
significant, perhaps even alarming, departures from this
trend. First, North Korea is developing new classes of
missiles despite its economic problems. Second, China is
purchasing significant quantities of first-line military
weapons from Russia and is developing new classes of
ballistic and cruise missiles. The People’s Liberation Army
is slowly building its capability to project military force into
the South China Sea. 57 China’s published defense budget
has only kept up with inflation, according to its July 1998
Defense White Paper, but its hardware purchases and the
missile buildup indicate that much more is being spent on
defense modernization than Beijing admits. 58 The missile
build-ups in North Korea and in China are particularly
serious and have highlighted the question of whether or not
theater and national missile defenses (TMD and NMD) are
necessary for the Asia-Pacific region. If such missile
defenses are not carefully configured as part of a larger
cooperative security framework in the region, they may
trigger an arms race and increase tensions rather than
reduce them. However, with or without the introduction of
missile defense systems, current trends in Asia have the
potential to spark a serious arms race. 59 China views missile
defense measures as destabilizing, especially as far as
Taiwan is concerned,because TMD for the island threatens
to negate China’s significant missile strike capability in the
Taiwan Strait. 60 Moreover, the ambitions of China, Japan,
and the two Koreas could escalate into the militarization of
outer space. 61
Future Challenges.
The simplest way for defense planners and strategists to
deal with how the future may look is by conceiving of it as a
linear projection of the present. This sort of conception
requires a minimum of creative thinking and permits
resource planners to factor in parallel increases in defense
budgets. Even if least-preferred and most-preferred
outcomes are factored in, linear projections are simply
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easier to deal with from a fiscal and psychological
standpoint. A linear projection of the security situation in
East Asia would have North Korea implode, explode, or
somehow muddle through its present troubles, only to
reconcile somehow into a unified Korean Peninsula. But the
U.S. presence in Asia would not change. This linear
projection does not foresee a world war or even regional
conflict resulting from a North Korean attack on the south.
Such a projection envisions China evolving into a
responsible, albeit authoritarian, power which seeks to
avoid dominating the region through military actions. The
status quo in the Taiwan Strait would remain, with
occasional military demonstrations on either side to deter
the other from action. Under this linear forecast, economic
recovery from the East Asian financial crisis would continue
for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. These trends,
combined with continued diplomatic and military
engagement by the United States, should produce the sort of
region envisioned in the National Security Strategy.62 And
all of this is possible; not likely, but possible. Rather than
outline these bad-better-best scenarios in detail, we will
instead outline some of the significant types of upheavals
and departures from this vision that could seriously
challenge the United States in the next 20-25 years.
The Proliferation of Missiles and Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
The use of missiles and precision weaponry so
successfully by the United States has made missiles,
especially, a weapon of choice. The lessons of the Gulf War
(1990-91), the ability to use anti-radar missiles to suppress
Iraq’s anti-aircraft batteries, the response to the bombings
of U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, and the use of precision
weaponry in Kosovo during the air campaign in 1999, have,
for many countries, reinforced the belief that there is a
viable alternative to the sacrifice of soldiers in combat.
Longer-range cruise missiles are expensive, but are
effective in what will become “stand-off warfare.” While this
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development is not new, what is new is how accurate these
missiles have become, and the ready availability of nuclear,
chemical, biological warheads. Shorter-range missiles, such
as over-the-horizon cruise missiles, are considerably
cheaper and would be effective in controlling contested
waters, straits, or across disputed land borders. These
systems are highly mobile and difficult to hit with
anti-missile systems. More seriously, the best defense
against them is to hunt down launch platforms or storage
areas and strike them. Thus the proliferation and use of
cruise and short-range ballistic missiles, which we see as
highly likely, are also particularly destabilizing because
defense against them requires some kind of strike. Thus the
emphasis by the United States on non-proliferation is
unlikely to succeed because of the very effectiveness
demonstrated by the United States and its allies in using
the weapons. Missile proliferation will be a tremendous
challenge for the U.S. armed forces in Asia. More seriously,
threatened countries or nation state-like actors (here
Taiwan comes to mind) will need to build up the capacity to
attack potential enemies and strike missile launch points or
production facilities. 63 A volatile crisis, then, could escalate
much more quickly into war in the future, and the United
States could be involved.
Ballistic missiles are perhaps less destabilizing than
cruise missiles as weapons, since we may be able to develop
effective defenses against them, but they are cheaper and
easier to manufacture. These too, will proliferate. India,
Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and China all have
ballistic missile programs and nuclear capabilities. 64 China
is building a formidable missile force opposite Taiwan to
coerce the people on that island not to opt for
independence. 65 Right now, according to opinion polls on
Taiwan, that coercion appears to be working. Numerous
surveys conducted between 1995 and 1998 on the island
consistently show 45 percent or more of those interviewed
favor some form of the status quo. 66 But future voters on
Taiwan may be more independence-minded. The scenario in
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the Taiwan Strait is particularly alarming because China
continues to threaten the use of force to prevent a
declaration of independence by Taiwan. 67 The March 2000
presidential election in Taiwan should provide a bellwether
of both the direction of political trends on the island and the
trajectory of Taiwan-mainland relations for the rest of 21 st
century. The goal of unification with Taiwan was
highlighted on the threshold of the new millennium with the
return of the small Portuguese colony of Macao to Chinese
control in December 1999 after more than 450 years of
foreign occupation. Beijing’s propaganda machine played
up this event as a proud day for all Chinese and President
Jiang Zemin recently remarked that now “the task of
resolving the Taiwan issue” is “increasingly urgent.” 68
North Korea’s No Dong and Taepo Dong series missiles
almost guarantee that some form of retaliatory or defense
capability must be developed in Japan and South Korea. In
fact, of all of the emerging threats from “rogue nations,”
North Korea stands out as the main threat in Northeast
Asia. While some doubt that North Korea can survive
another decade given its current problems, others
anticipate the Pyongyang regime will somehow muddle
through. 69 In Japan, where a new sense of security is
developing, one security specialist at the Institute for
International Policy Studies insisted that China, not North
Korea, is the real target of regional defense buildups in
Asia.70
The Nation-State as the Primary Actor. As the forgoing
discussion suggests, we believe that the nation-state will
continue to exist and remain the primary structural
component of relations in the region during the 20-25 year
period under discussion. Thus, issues of territorial
sovereignty, national self-determination, political and
economic interest will continue to be resolved between or
among nations. That said, regional groupings and
sub-groupings, such as ASEAN, the security-related
ASEAN regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), the Northeast Asia Cooperative
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Dialogue (NEACD), and the South Pacific Forum will still
be influential. Non-governmental organizations like
NEACD or the Conference for Security Cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific (CSCAO) will be useful, but will only facilitate
state-to-state relations. The difficulty will be whether a
regional sub-grouping can, or should, successfully begin to
address security issues with a collective voice backed by
arms if necessary, instead of just discussing problems. The
strength of NATO is that it can act, even if it takes some
time to reach a political consensus. In Asia, no sub-regional
group has successfully made the transition from dialogue to
action. If there is a place where nations may come to address
security issues collectively it is probably Northeast Asia.
The periodic belligerence of North Korea combined with its
nuclear and missile capabilities has brought about no
concrete steps between Japan and South Korea to respond
to Pyongyang, but Tokyo and Seoul are talking about the
issue.71
Ethnicity and Religion. The polarizing trend of ethnic or
religious division and strife that tore apart the Balkans
could manifest itself in Asia. Indeed, such tensions are
already present, as evidenced by the anti-Chinese riots in
Indonesia in 1998. One relic of the colonial period in Asia is
the disproportionate influence or control of national
economies, particularly in Southeast Asia, by minority
ethnic Chinese. Singapore aside, ethnic Chinese, who make
up no more than 10 percent of the population in the states of
Southeast Asia, control 70 to 90 percent of the wealth in
these countries. 72 There is little tension in Thailand over
ethnicity, and most Chinese there have been assimilated. In
Vietnam, after unification in 1975, the massive expulsion of
ethnic Chinese led to problems in Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Thailand as refugees fled. In fact, one pretext used by
China as justification for its 1979 attack on Vietnam was to
“punish” that country for its treatment of what Beijing
called “overseas Chinese compatriots.”
That exodus from Vietnam was an irritant, but not a
threat to regional security and stability. Nor did it
20

fundamentally affect U.S. interests. A major, destructive
round of attacks on ethnic Chinese, such as what happened
in 1998 in Indonesia, however, could so destabilize that
country that an evacuation of U.S. citizens might be
necessary. The United States might also be asked to
cooperate with Australia to help stabilize the situation. One
of Australia’s security concerns is that serious unrest in
Indonesia could lead to destabilizing refugee outflows into
the Northern Territories. A similar scenario might affect
Malaysia. In both Indonesia and Malaysia, which are
predominantly Muslim, Chinese are not only ethnic, but
also religious minorities. If the U.S. Department of Defense
is currently maintaining approximately one division in the
Balkans on humanitarian missions, could it, or would it do
the same in Southeast Asia?
On the border between Myanmar and Thailand another
manageable irritant could turn into a major crisis with the
potential to involve the United States. In a small series of
enclaves on the Thai side of the border north and southwest
of Chiangmai, the Royal Thai Armed Forces have allowed
the Karen people to maintain villages and farms. 73 The
Karen are a distinct ethnic group in Myanmar who are also
different from the predominant religion there because they
are primarily Christians (a legacy of the British colonial
period and the Karen’s service with British forces fighting
the Japanese in World War II). The Karen National
Liberation Army conducts a low-level insurgency against
the Myanmar Army, which could escalate. In the event that
the conflict grows more serious, Burmese troops would
undoubtedly violate the territorial sovereignty of Thailand
to suppress the guerrillas. They have done this before, in
small scale, resulting in clashes with the Royal Thai Army.
A larger scale offensive against the Karen could escalate to a
major clash with a traditional U.S. ally putting the United
States in the difficult position of somehow assisting in the
situation.
Control of Natural Resources. Resource conflicts are also
potential sources of regional instability. In Indochina, the
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headwaters of the Mekong River begin in China and flow
along the Lao-Thai border through Cambodia into Vietnam.
Security thinkers at strategy institutes in Vietnam are
concerned that efforts to control the headwaters of the
Mekong in China or Laos could dry up the major source of
water for Cambodia and southern Vietnam’s rice crops. 74
Similar concerns are expressed in Hanoi about efforts in
China to control the headwaters of the Red River, which
feeds agriculture in the Hanoi-Haiphong delta. Resource
concerns like this may be of peripheral interest to the
United States today, but could become explosive security
issues that might disrupt regional security. Analysts in
Bangkok and in other institutes studying Asia make similar
arguments about control of the headwaters of the Chao
Phya, Salween, Irrawaddy, Brahamaputra, and Ganges
Rivers, all of which are in China. Major water control
projects in China, they argue, could have deleterious effects
on Thailand, Burma, Nepal, Bangladesh, and India. 75
Conclusion: “Shaping” and “Pivotal States.”
The greatest and most fundamental future challenge to
the United States in the Asia-Pacific region may simply be
to maintain a presence. A peaceful resolution of the division
of the Korean Peninsula could lead to broader challenges to
the continued forward stationing of U.S. troops in Northeast
Asia. A resurgent, expansionist, or nationalistic Russia
could emerge in the coming years, which would require a
response from the United States. And China, which many
analysts of strategic affairs believe is a country focused on
internal matters with no history of expansion, could turn
into a more modern state with an effective military force.
Thus any U.S. withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific could serve
as a catalyst for the destabilization of the region. The United
States must nurture and strengthen relationships with its
traditional allies: Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia,
Thailand, and the Philippines. Today all of these countries
are democracies and share our values.
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Beyond this immediate attention to military presence
and alliances, the United States should pay greater
attention to “shaping” the Asia-Pacific region. The United
States tends to give most attention to the “responding” and
“preparing” aspects of our National Security Strategy and
National Military Strategy. In shaping, all the elements of
national power should be employed—including “soft”
dimensions—to decrease tensions and nurture the regional
trends of democratization and marketization. A comprehensive approach of engagement that includes commercial,
educational, and cultural programs as well as militaryto-military relations is necessary.
To have a reasonable chance of success, a concerted
“shaping initiative” in U.S. policy toward Asia must be
consensus-based, sustained, and focused. There must be a
bipartisan consensus that such an effort is important.
Furthermore, coordination and planning between the
executive branch agencies and the Congress is essential. It
is very difficult for any policy initiative to rise above the
bureaucratic infighting and partisan politics of
Washington. 76 To be sustained, a presidential advisory
group should be established and charged with: (a) designing
a road map for U.S. policy toward Asia with a 20- to 25-year
time horizon, and (b) developing a coordinating mechanism
for whatever policy is devised—along the lines suggested by
the Perry Report that reviewed U.S. policy toward North
Korea.77
The foundations for thriving democracies and vibrant
open markets are not formed in a matter of a few years;
rather, such institutions require decades of effort and
persistent optimism in the face of inevitable setbacks and
crises. Democratization in particular is a difficult and
frustrating process. And the Asia-Pacific region
encompasses dozens of extremely diverse countries, all in
different stages of political, economic, and social
development. A “one size fits all” approach is ill advised.
Moreover, in the current post-Cold War resource-
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constrained policy environment, customizing an initiative
for each country is simply unworkable.
A shaping policy that is focused on a handful of linchpin
or “pivotal” states is the only realistic option. 78 These are
volatile countries upon which the stability and prosperity of
the region or a sub-region hinge. Clearly, one such country is
China. Without a peaceful, prosperous China firmly
integrated into the global economic system, the bright
future of the Asia-Pacific region cannot be assured. The
critical bilateral relationship to facilitate this is the
U.S.-China relationship.
After some difficult years in the Washington-Beijing
ties, the trade and Belgrade embassy compensation
agreements reached in late 1999 hold out the promise of
continued improvement in bilateral ties. 79 While a host of
other thorny issues confront bilateral relations, both sides
have important interests in continued cordial ties. The most
potentially explosive issue for the foreseeable future is
Taiwan. Tensions may periodically increase in the Taiwan
Strait and the threat of hostilities there is real. 80
Washington must continue to press both Beijing and Taipei
to work towards a peaceful resolution of their ongoing
dispute. And China has changed in profound ways over the
course of two decades of reforms. These changes are not
limited to market-oriented economic reforms—there have
also been significant political and social transformations
that might become building blocks for democratization in
the 21st century. 81
Indonesia is the pivotal state in Southeast Asia. 82 As the
most populous and expansive state in the sub-region,
Indonesia is very much also a pivot for the entire region. As
noted earlier in this monograph, this sprawling archipelago
confronts enormous political, economic, social, and ethnic
challenges. Nevertheless, dramatic changes in 1998 and
1999, including the election of a new president, acceptance
of independence for East Timor, and a surprisingly resilient
economy, hold significant promise for Jakarta.
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North Korea is the pivotal country in Northeast Asia and
arguably a key state upon which the security and prosperity
of the entire Asia-Pacific region hinges. The Korean War is
still technically and de facto ongoing: since the hot war
finished with the 1953 armistice, a cold war has existed.
Now, half a century after the outbreak of hostilities in June
1950, it is time for the United States to seek a peace
settlement on the peninsula. After the dramatic and
remarkable progress in managing the communal conflicts
in the Middle East and Northern Ireland, the United States,
in coordination with its friends and allies, should begin a
peace process in Northeast Asia. However, no peace process
can move forward without our staunch ally, the Republic of
Korea, being fully consulted and in complete accord. The
goal should be to render obsolete the tripwire at the 38th
Parallel. Whether this entails the continued existence of
two Korean states or unification, the matter is ripe for
shaping.
While in conventional wisdom the Pyongyang regime is
depicted as an irrational and unpredictable player, upon
closer examination its actions seem very rational and quite
predictable. 83 Hence it is feasible to conceive of a
rapprochement with North Korea. Indeed, the major barrier
to improved relations may be the actions to date of the
United States. Too often the United States has concentrated
exclusively on either a ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ approach rather
than attempting to use the two in tandem. 84 Dealing with
North Korea is admittedly a tricky business even in the best
of circumstances. Focusing exclusively on Pyongyang’s
nuclear and missile capability and status as a proliferator
has its pitfalls. It is advisable to build a relationship across a
broader front. Certainly WMD capability and delivery
systems are the most critical aspects of the North Korean
issue but developing bilateral relations in this area alone
provides a fragile and narrow base upon which to build
future growth. Moreover, while the United States should
proceed expeditiously, Washington should avoid the
temptation to rush into agreements and appear to
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reward—-and hence reinforce—Pyongyang’s brinkmanship
behavior with various material quid pro quos. The
establishment of liaison offices and the normalization of
relations should be done slowly and carefully, and only in
response to tangible progress and verifiable concessions
from North Korea. Starting modestly and gradually to
increase non-official and non-political interaction and
exchanges with Pyongyang would be well worth the effort.
We could build a relationship through cultural exchanges
and athletic competitions. Before one dismisses this as a
waste of energy or time, it is worth remembering that
“Ping-Pong diplomacy” was central to paving the way for a
rapprochement with China in the 1970s, and friendly soccer
and wrestling matches have warmed ties with Iran in the
1990s. Even the Women’s World Cup Final championship
game played between China and the United States in the
United States in July 1999 helped warm the chill in
relations between Washington and Beijing. While it is true
that the game took place during a troubled period of
U.S.-China relations and many Chinese believe the U.S.
team won the game unfairly (because the American
goalkeeper violated penalty kick rules), it did prompt an
exchange of goodwill at the highest levels. President Clinton
attended the game, met with the Chinese team afterwards,
and sent a personal note to Chinese President Jiang Zemin
congratulating him on the performance of the Chinese
women. President Jiang responded to President Clinton’s
note the very same day. 85
In fact, sporting and cultural diplomacy has already
begun. The North Korean national women’s soccer team
visited the United States in mid-1999 to participate in the
World Cup Finals. The U.S. team and North Korean teams
actually met on the soccer field in an opening round game.
The contest and, indeed, the North Korean visit itself, can
only be termed a success in regard to the goodwill it
generated. More recently, in December 1999, Roger Clinton,
President Clinton’s half brother, performed in a variety
show along with a troupe of popular entertainers from
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South Korea before an elite North Korean audience in
Pyongyang. The younger Clinton also met with Kim Yong
Nam, North Korea’s number two leader. 86 However, while
such people-to-people diplomacy proceeds, military
pressure must continue to be applied. The annual Foal
Eagle exercises between U.S. and South Korean forces
should continue, for example.
Beyond tangible economic benefits, North Korea seeks
international respect and acceptance. If Pyongyang is
forthcoming in other more substantive matters (e.g., lives
up to its agreements in the 1994 Agreed Framework and
1999 Berlin Accord), a full set of cultural and sporting
exchanges can get underway. These can begin on a very
modest basis at the grassroots level. American high school
or college bands and basketball or soccer teams, for
example, could visit North Korea and be reciprocated. Such
activities entail no substantial cost or risk to the United
States but build much needed understanding and goodwill
between populations. It is vital that Washington involve the
American people in the conduct of North Korea policy—the
American public must understand and support this policy
initiative if it is to be sustained and have a chance of
succeeding.
Perhaps, a way can be found for the North to provide a
venue for one or more games in the 2002 World Cup Soccer
Finals. Such a possibility is eminently feasible since, by
being awarded to two countries instead of the usual
one—the tournament is to be hosted jointly by Japan and
South Korea—the event is already unprecedented in world
soccer history. 87 Possibly, if the U.S. team qualifies, there
exists the prospect of playing one of its opening round games
north of the 38th parallel. The goal of such efforts, of course,
is to reduce Pyongyang’s isolation, provide incentives for the
regime to cooperate on security issues, and beyond that for
North Korea to evolve into a more open and prosperous
society.
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With an appropriate consensus-based, sustained, and
focused policy initiative on the part of the United States, the
new millennium can herald a new era of prolonged peace
with unprecedented political and economic development for
all the countries of the Asia-Pacific.
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